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3.1  Introduction 
A key issue in the Market 2000 debate is whether the fragmentation of trad- 
ing  in  individual  stocks harms  or enhances  market quality. The New York 
Stock Exchange  (NYSE) has  steadily  lost market  share to the regional  ex- 
changes, to National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) broker-dealers, 
and, more recently, to proprietary trading systems (PTSs) such as Instinet, In- 
stinet Crossing, Posit, the Arizona Stock Exchange, and Lattice.  This increas- 
ingly effective competition naturally leads to the fragmentation of order flow. 
Although fragmentation disperses the orders, most competitors are informa- 
tionally linked, so that all participants observe each others’ trades and quotes 
within seconds of their execution.? 
In the competition for order flow of listed securities, the NYSE is the domi- 
nant market center because of its natural advantages resulting from its histori- 
cal position, from dominance in listings, and from a variety of rules that pro- 
vide it with competitive advantages. In spite of these advantages, the erosion 
of NYSE market share appears to be increasing, particularly as the PTSs and 
third-market dealers-especially  Madoff and Madoff clones-gain  competi- 
tive strength. Perhaps the most important result of the Market 2000 debate will 
be the reaction of regulators and legislators to the fragmentation issue. 
Branch and Freed (1977) investigate the relative impacts on spreads of in- 
creased competition and lost volume due to fragmentation of NYSE trading. 
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These authors conclude that competition plays a much larger role in reducing 
spreads than loss of volume plays in increasing them. Hamilton (1979) notes 
that off-exchange trading of listed stocks can result in smaller and less volatile 
bid-ask spreads if effects due to increased competition  predominate. If frag- 
mentation of trading reduces economies of scale, spreads will be larger and 
more volatile. Hamilton concludes that at the time of his study the net effect 
of fragmentation  is to reduce spreads and returns variance by at most a few 
percent. It should be stressed that the focus of these papers is on competition 
between the NYSE and other market centers. 
Mendelson (1  987) develops a model showing that fragmentation reduces the 
expected quantity traded, increases the price variance traders face, and reduces 
expected gains from trade. But the model also shows that fragmentation may 
improve the quality of market price signals. Although these theoretical argu- 
ments  show that concentrating  orders at one location  can reduce spreads, a 
crucial  assumption  underlying  this  result is that the  specialist,  who is then 
given a monopoly position, will act altruistically for the public welfare rather 
than extract monopoly profits from traders. 
Several studies have examined related topics. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and 
Whitcomb (1982) examine whether brokerage firms should be allowed to offer 
in-house execution services or all transactions should be forced instead to go 
through an exchange. These authors develop a model leading to the conclusion 
that the ancillary services exchanges offer, such as stabilization and surveil- 
lance, which have characteristics of public goods, will be undersupplied when 
fragmentation exists. Cohen and Conroy (1990) examine Securities and Ex- 
change Commission (SEC) rule  19c-3, which allows off-exchange trading of 
NYSE stocks listed after April 26, 1979. They find that during 1983 increased 
fragmentation resulted in lower spreads but greater return variance. 
This paper examines the impact of fragmentation on the quality of markets 
as measured by the bid-ask spread, premium (the difference between the mid- 
point of the outstanding  spread and the price), and volatility  (variance of re- 
turn). The research design employed forms five stock portfolios that are equal 
in the attributes known to affect  spreads and volatility. Firm attributes held 
equal include  size, financial leverage, dividend  payout,  and market-to-book 
ratio. Trading characteristics held equal include stock price, market risk, dollar 
volume of trading, trading frequency, the availability of options for stocks, and 
membership in the S&P 500. 
The key aspect of the research design is that the difference in the fragmenta- 
tion of orders is maximized across the five portfolios. Hence the portfolios are 
nearly identical in attributes that affect their spreads, premiums, and volatility, 
and as different as possible in fragmentation  of order share. Examination  of 
the portfolio bid-ask  spread, premium, and volatility  supports the view  that 
competition between market centers is beneficial for market participants. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into seven sections. In section 3.2 the 
data are described. How fragmentation is measured, the variables used in the 
study, and how trading quality is measured follow. Next, the linear program- 65  Competition, Fragmentation, and Market Quality 
ming (LP) model is described. Section 3.7 presents the findings and the final 
section the conclusions. 
3.2  The Data 
Trading data for 1991 for NYSE-listed common stocks were obtained from 
the Institute for the Study of  Security Markets (ISSM) tapes. Balance-sheet 
data for the three years ending in  1990 were obtained from Compustat files. 
The following criteria were used in selecting the sample. The data needed for 
each variable must be present on both the ISSM and Compustat tapes. To mini- 
mize thin trading problems, only common stocks with at least one thousand 
trades during the year are considered. To avoid the aberrant spread behavior of 
low-priced stocks, only stocks with an average price of at least $5 are included 
in the sample. A total of 980 firms met these criteria. 
3.3  Measuring the Fragmentation of Trading 
Fragmentation is measured using the Herfindahl index, which is commonly 
employed in the economics literature to assess the concentration of industries. 
For this study, the Herfindahl index calculation is based on the dollar volume 
of  trading in NYSE-listed  stocks during  1991 on the  NYSE, each regional 
exchange, and Nasdaq. If trading occurs solely on the NYSE, the index value 
for that  stock is 0.0. As trading  becomes  increasingly  dispersed,  the  index 
value increases toward 1  .O.  Let P, equal the dollar volume on an exchange for 
stock i divided by the total dollar volume for stock i on all exchanges. And let 
n,  equal the number of  exchanges on which stock i trades.  Define p,  as the 
summation of P: across n,. Then the Herfindahl index for stock i is calculated 
as 
HERFINDAHLl = (1 -  p,)/((n,  -  1)pJ. 
Examples of market shares based on dollar volume and Herfindahl indexes 
for the first ten securities in our sample are provided  in table 3.1. The more 
dispersed the order flow, the greater the value of the Herfindahl index. 
3.4  Equalizing Portfolio Trading Attributes 
As noted above, the research design involves forming portfolios with similar 
attributes so that the spread, premium, and volatility are equalized, except for 
the influence of  fragmentation. The average value for the period  1988-90  of 
the following firm attributes is held equal in the five portfolios. 
LASSET  Log of assets 
FINLEV  Financial leverage 
PAYOUT  Dividend payout 
MRKTBK  Market-to-book ratio 66  Thomas H. McInish and Robert A. Wood 
Table 3.1  Market Share on the NYSE, Nasdaq, and Regional Exchanges and 
Herfindah1 Index Values for the Securities of Ten Firms, 1991 
Market Share for Exchange (million $) 
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Norest  The securities represent the  first ten  firms  in  the study sample. Market share is dollar trading 
volume for 1991. None of these ten securities had trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. 
FINLEV is defined as total debdtotal assets  X  100. Three years of  data are 
used for each of these variables to reduce the impact of any unusual observa- 
tions for an individual year. The attributes of the common stock that are held 
equal in the five portfolios are 






Log of dollar volume of trading 
Obtained from the 1990 Compustat tape 
Margidoption flag; 1 = optionable/marginable, 0 = not 
S&P 500 flag; 0 = member, 1 = not member 
Number of trades per day 
AVGPRI, LN$VOLUME, and NOTRADES are the averages for these vari- 
ables over the year  1991. OPTION and S&P are 011  variables whose values 
are taken from the ISSM header record for 1991. LASSET and LN$VOLUME 
are in log form, since the distributions of  these variables are highly skewed. 
Examination of the remaining variables does not indicate a need for log trans- 
formation prior to use. 
The inclusion of  each of these variables is based in part on the following 
articles: LASSET (Thomadakis 1977; Banz 1981; Reinganum 198  I), FINLEV 
(Hamada 1972), PAYOUT (Ball 1978), MRKT/BK (Lustgarten and Thoma- 
dakis  1987), AVGPRI (Roll 198  1 ;  McInish and Wood  1992), LN$VOLUME 
(Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam 1993), BETA (Sharpe 1964), OPTION (Fede- 
nia and Grammatikos 1992), S&P (Harris and Gurel 1986; Jegadeesh and Su- 
brahmanyam 1993), and NOTRADES (Stoll 1978; McInish and Wood 1992). 
The LP holds both the first and second moments of the variables described 
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by equalizing the log of assets. Holding the market-to-book ratio equal ensures 
that the growth expectations in all portfolios are the same. Note that this proce- 
dure results  in holding  market  capitalizations  approximately  equal as well. 
Each of the trading attributes held equal is known to affect both the bid-ask 
spread and volatility. Equalizing the trading attributes as measured during the 
test year (with the exception of beta) rather than during a prior period better 
controls for the influence of these variables on fragmentation. 
Table 3.2 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
values for each variable for the entire sample. 
3.5  Trading Quality Measurement 
Trading quality for the five portfolios is measured with three variables: bid- 
ask spread (SPREAD) in cents; PREMIUM, as measured by the absolute value 
of the difference between the midpoint of the outstanding NYSE bid and ask 
and  the  trade  price;  and  VOLATILITY, calculated  as  the  variance  of  the 
minute-by-minute returns for each portfolio over the year. SPREAD is formed 
by first obtaining the average for each stock in the sample over the year and 
then obtaining the weighted average within each portfolio where the weight is 
the LP solution level (discussed below). PREMIUM is calculated in the same 
manner. VOLATILITY is calculated by  first forming a minute-by-minute re- 
turn index for each portfolio  (weighting the return for each stock by  its LP 
solution level) and then calculating the standard deviation of the return series 
over the year. 
3.6  Linear Programming Model 
Before describing the LP model more formally, it may be helpful to provide 
an intuitive description. The LP forces the sample firms into five portfolios so 
that the attributes noted above are held equal in each portfolio. Both the mean 
Table 3.2  Sample Statistics for Each Variable for the Entire Sample (N = 980) 
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and the standard deviation of the attributes are held equal so that the LP will 
not, for example, have one extreme portfolio with very large and very small 
firms while the other extreme portfolio has all average-sized firms. Although 
the means of firm size would be equal across portfolios in this case, the size 
composition of firms in the portfolios would vary considerably. Holding equal 
the standard deviation of firm size in the portfolios alleviates this concern. 
In considering the number of variables included, note that multicollinearity, 
which may be a significant problem when adding variables to any variant of 
the general linear model, is not of concern with the LP model. Although each 
added variable narrow5 the reach of the objective function somewhat, this is 
not a problem for most research designs. Thus, adding variables that might be 
considered overcontrolling, for example, using both the market-to-book  ratio 
and the dividend payout ratio to control for growth, will not compromise the 
research. However, increasing the number of constraints may lead to spreading 
the sample firms across portfolios as discussed below. 
The LP model used to form the five portfolios is 
(1)  Maximize  c  f5,  HERFINDAHL, 
I 
- c  f,, HERFINDAHLJ,  j  = 1, . . . ,980  firms. 
I 
subject to 
(14  ci-kJ  HERFINDAHL, -  HERFINDAHL, = 
HERFINDAHL, - c  i-k-2  HERFINDAHL,, 
I  J 
c 
J  I 
j  = 1,.  . . ,980 firms,  i = 1, . . . ,5  portfolios,  k = 3,4,5 
(lb-lk)  cJrJ  XJ = c  XJ/5 -+  A,  j  = 1, . . . ,980  firms, 
J  I 
i = 1,. .  . ,5  portfolios 
(11-lu)  c  fifX,’ =  X,%  2 A,  j  = 1, . . . ,980  firms, 
I  I 
i = 1,. . . ,  5 portfolios 
(1v)  ELJ = 98015 2 A,  j  = 1,. . . ,980 firms, 
J 
i = 1,. . . ,  5 portfolios 
(1w)  xi,  = 1 -t A,  J  = 1,.  . . ,980 firms, 
J 
i = 1,. . . ,  5  portfolios 
(14  A = 0.001 
whereiJ  is the LP solution variable that represents the amount of the ith portfo- 
lio’s funds invested in firm j,  X represents, in turn, each of the remaining vari- 
ables described above, and X2  represents the squared valued of  these variables. 69  Competition, Fragmentation, and Market Quality 
The objective function of the LP given in equation (1) maximizes the differ- 
ence between the value of HERFINDAHL in portfolio 1 and the value of HER- 
FINDAHL in portfolio 5. Hence, one extreme portfolio will have the least frag- 
mentation of its trading, while the other extreme portfolio will have the most. 
Equation (la) holds the distance between  the HERFINDAHL values of the 
intervening portfolios equal. Equations (lb-1 k) hold the first moments of the 
control variables  equal, while  equations (11-lu)  hold  the  second  moments 
equal. Equation (lv) holds the number of stocks in each portfolio equal, while 
equation (lw)  forces every stock into the solution. 
As table 3.3 shows, the LP  achieves the desired goal. The resulting portfolios 
are nearly identical in attributes that affect their trading quality, while the mea- 
sure of  trading  fragmentation  (HERFINDAHL) is spread evenly across the 
portfolios. The difference in the level of HERFINDAHL across the five portfo- 
lios is maximized. With these portfolios, we can isolate the effect of fragmen- 
tation on portfolio trading characteristics. 
Table 3.3  Statistics for Sample Portfolios: Mean and Standard 
Deviation (below) 
Portfolio 
1  2  3  4  5 
HERFINDAHL  0.138 
0.089 
LASSET  7.20 
1.70 
FINLEV  26.17 
17.00 
PAYOUT  49.90 
57.66 
MRKTlBK  2.06 
1.43 
AVGPRI  31.41 
24.24 
LN$VOLUME  15.21 
1.60 
BETA  1.03 
0.42 
OPTION  0.54 
0.50 
S&P  0.61 
0.49 
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Notes: The means and standard deviations of each variable for each of the five portfolios formed 
using the LP model are presented. The LP separates the Herfindahl index values as much as pos- 
sible across the five portfolios. At the same time, it holds the values of each of  the other variables 
approximately equal across the five portfolios. 70  Thomas H. McInish and Robert A. Wood 
The LP solution  technique  chosen results  in  continuous solution  values 
rather than integer solution values. With an integer solution, firms would be 
totally in one of the five portfolios. Finance theory permits a continuous solu- 
tion  wherein a firm may be spread over more than one portfolio,  since it is 
realistic to form portfolios in this manner. Since the LP  formulation is basically 
an assignment problem, the solution values naturally gravitate to either 0.0 or 
1.0 as long as the constraints are not too binding, so that relatively few firms 
are spread across portfolios. In the solution obtained, 88 percent of the nonzero 
solution values are 1.0. The results were replicated by rounding the solution 
values of 0.5 and above to 1 .O and those below 0.5 to 0.0 to ensure that signifi- 
cant bias did not result. 
This low level of intermediate solution values is fortunate, since the size of 
the  problem  makes  integer  programming  computationally  intractable.  The 
need to have a relatively  low number of solution values between 0.0 and  1.0 
arises because,  as the number of intermediate  solution values increases, the 
intent of the equality constraints is being defeated. To illustrate, if a $10 billion 
firm has a solution value of  0.5 for portfolio  1  and 0.5 for portfolio 2, the size 
equality  constraints  will indicate that  a $5 billion  firm is being included  in 
each portfolio. 
If strict equality were specified in the LP constraints, no feasible solution 
could be obtained. Hence, each equality constraint is held equal to 0.0 plus or 
minus 0.1 percent. Thus, rather than obtaining exactly  1.0 for most nonzero 
solution values, we obtain 0.999 or 1.001. 
3.7  Why Use LP to Form Portfolios 
The 980 sample stocks could be analyzed by applying a form of the general 
linear model to the individual trades and quotes. Three concerns arise from 
this procedure. First, the signal obtained in this manner is very noisy as a result 
of bid-ask bounce and the high level of idiosyncratic risk in each stock. Sec- 
ond, the functional form of the linear model must be specified. Third, multicol- 
linearity  among the dependent variables may  confound the results. Each of 
these problems is minimized or avoided with the use of LP to form portfolios. 
While portfolios are often used to avoid the noisy signal problem, the typical 
approach of ranking on a variable such as market capitalization does not avoid 
multicollinearity. To illustrate the problems that result from the traditional pro- 
cedure, data for market capitalization (EQUITY), MRKTBK, PAYOUT,  AVG- 
PRI, and BETA are averaged for 3,995 firms on the Compustat Plus tile for the 
three years ending in  1991. The Spearman correlations of EQUITY with the 
remaining  variables  are MRKTBK 0.30195,  PAYOUT  0.56676, AVGPRI 
0.86729, and BETA 0.10597. All of these correlation coefficients are signifi- 
cant at the 0.0001 level. While data for spreads, trading frequency, and stock 
price were not available  for this sample, we know from other research  that 
these variables are highly correlated with market capitalization. Thus, ranking 71  Competition, Fragmentation, and Market Quality 
on market capitalization introduces considerable correlation in these variables 
across the portfolios. It is easy to see that many research designs will be con- 
founded by these correlations. The LP approach controls this source of bias in 
portfolio formulation. While portfolios are often used to avoid the noisy signal 
problem, the typical approach of ranking on a variable such as market capital- 
ization does not avoid multicollinearity. The determination of the number of 
portfolios to be formed involves a judgment between the advantage of reducing 
the noise of the signal in each portfolio by increasing it size versus the advan- 
tage of increasing the number of observations. 
3.8  Findings 
Table 3.4 repeats the values of HERFINDAHL for the five portfolios and 
reports the levels of  SPREAD, PREMIUM, and VOLATILITY as well. The 
values of the liquidity and spread measures for each of the five portfolios are 
also presented graphically in figure 3.1. Note that both  SPREAD and PRE- 
MIUM tend to decrease as fragmentation increases. The Pearson  correlation 
coefficients presented in table 3.4 show that these relationships are significant 
at the 0.05  level. Volatility decreases from a level of 0.052 for portfolio 5, 
which has the least order flow fragmentation, to portfolio 3, but then increases 
for portfolios 1 and 2,  reaching 0.073. The correlation between portfolio vola- 
tility and the Herfindahl index is not statistically significant. 
Although the observed range of spread across the five portfolios is only 0.6 
cent, this evidence nevertheless  supports the hypothesis that competition be- 
tween market centers, which, if effective, naturally results in fragmentation of 
the order flow, reduces both SPREAD and PREMIUM, thereby benefiting mar- 
ket participants. Further,  VOLATILITY is not  found to be affected  signifi- 
cantly by fragmentation. 
Table 3.4  Statistics for Analysis of the Effect of Trading Fragmentation 
Portfolio  HERFINDAHL  SPREAD  PREMIUM  VOLATILITY 
~~ 
1  0.138  0.241  0.059  0.073 
2  0.114  0.239  0.058  0.062 
3  0.089  0.244  0.060  0.035 
4  0.065  0.244  0.061  0.038 
5  0.040  0.247  0.064  0.052 
Pearson correlation  -0.9018  -0.8929  0.6366 
coefficient of 
HERFINDAHL  (0.036)  (0.041)  (0.248) 
(confidence level in 
parentheses) 
Nore:  The means  of  Herfindahl index (HERFINDAHL), spread  (SPREAD), premium  (PRE- 
MIUM), and portfolio variance (VOLATILITY) are provided for each of  the five sample port- 
folios. 72  Thomas H. McInish and Robert A. Wood 












Herfindahl Index  =  Avg  Liquidity Prem  Avg  Bid-Ask Spread 
Fig. 3.1  Average spread and liquidity premium of five portfolios with varying 
levels of off-board market share 
3.9  Conclusion 
In the Securities Reform Act of  1975, Congress mandated an increase in 
competition  between  the  regional  exchanges,  Nasdaq,  and  the  NYSE  for 
NYSE-listed securities. The NYSE has consistently argued that such competi- 
tion fragments the order flow to the detriment of  market quality. This study 
examines the NYSE concern by forming five portfolios of NYSE-listed com- 
mon  stocks. These five portfolios are nearly identical in attributes known to 
affect trading quality but have the maximum possible difference in the frag- 
mentation  of  trading  across competing market centers. These five portfolios 
isolate the effect of fragmentation on market quality. 
The findings show that bid-ask  spreads and premiums  (the difference be- 
tween the midpoint of the outstanding spread and the price) are significantly 
reduced by  competition. This result  is consistent with  evidence reported by 
Branch and Freed (1977), Hamilton  (1979), and McInish and Wood (1992) 
that competition  reduces  spreads. Volatility shows no significant  change  as 
fragmentation increases. Hence the traditional  view that competition benefits 73  Competition, Fragmentation, and Market Quality 
society is found to apply to securities  trading. This issue will be of continuing 
interest, since the General Accounting Office (Bothwell 1993) has urged the 
SEC to continue to monitor the issue of market fragmentation. 
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Comment  Harold Mulherin 
McInish and Wood present a timely piece on competition and fragmentation, 
a timeless topic that has induced heated debate among market participants for 
as long as organized exchanges have existed. The authors combine an innova- 
tive methodology with a clear and concise presentation to provide a significant 
contribution to the empirical literature on market microstructure. My primary 
reservation with the study is the particularly strong policy stance that the au- 
thors derive from their work. My comments include a review of the measure- 
ment ambiguities faced by any empirical study such as this but also advance a 
recommendation  for a more novel approach to the competitiodfragmentation 
debate that is rooted in the property-rights framework of Ronald Coase. 
Overview of Their Approach 
Let me first point to some of the notable features of the analysis. McInish 
and Wood position their research  amid the ongoing debate of the trade-offs 
involved in the choice between consolidation and fragmentation of securities 
trading. The primary  issue they  seek to address  is the effect  that  off-board 
trading has on the performance of the securities market in the United States. 
This question has repeatedly surfaced in the United States since the nineteenth- 
century battles between bucket shops and organized futures and securities ex- 
changes. (See Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl [  1991a, 1991  b].) The analysis of 
off-board trading is also highly pertinent to current-day matters tied to market 
automation as well as to much of the theme in the SEC’s Market 2000 study. 
The data used in the study include the bid-ask spreads, trading volume, and 
financial ratios of 980 NYSE-listed securities for the year 1991. The key inno- 
vation of the study is the use of a linear programming model that groups the 
980 firms into five portfolios having remarkably similar trading and financial 
characteristics but having differing fractions of trading away from the NYSE. 
This detailed method of controlling for the characteristics of the firms under 
analysis is the significant contribution of the paper to the literature on competi- 
tion and fragmentation. 
Across the five portfolios,  the analysis compares the amount of off-board 
trading, as captured by a Herfindahl measure of trading away from the NYSE, 
with measures  of  market quality  including the bid-ask  spread. The analysis 
distinguishes between a competition hypothesis, which predicts an inverse re- 
lation between off-board trading and spreads, and a fragmentation hypothesis, 
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which predicts that a larger Herfindahl measure will lead to wider spreads. The 
authors find that the portfolio  with the  greatest Herfindahl  measure  of  off- 
board trading has a spread that is 0.6 cent narrower than the portfolio that has 
the least amount of  off-board trading. They conclude that off-board trading 
advances competition  and that the SEC and Congress should take efforts to 
facilitate more dispersion of trading across securities markets. 
Measurement Issues 
Although the analysis in the paper is quite sound, there are several measure- 
ment issues that temper the policy implications that can be drawn from the 
results. A query that immediately comes to mind regards the economic sig- 
nificance of the results. While the authors find statistical significance, the dif- 
ference between the market quality of the two most extreme portfolios is still 
only 0.6 cent per share. Given the bid-ask spread of  24.1 cents per share for 
the most competitive portfolio, the savings to investors is around 2 percent. 
For the average security in the sample, which has 123 trades per day, this trans- 
lates into a savings of 74 cents per day. Certainly one can quibble with the 
economic significance of these numbers, but an even more telling benchmark 
comes from Charles Lee’s (1993, 1011) analysis of off-board trading in NYSE 
listings, which finds that “the price for non-NYSE trades is .7 to  1 cent per 
share less favorable than that for adjacent NYSE trades.” Hence, even if Mcln- 
ish and Wood have successfully measured the effect of competition on NYSE 
market quality, it is not obvious that mandated increases in off-board trading 
will improve investor welfare. Indeed, welfare may decline if the trade execu- 
tion of the regionals and Nasdaq is not as favorable as that of the NYSE. 
A second concern that I have with the empirical design is the ambiguous 
interpretation of the Herfindahl measure used in the study. The authors present 
the measure as a clean proxy for both fragmentation and competition, being 
of the opinion that fragmentation and competition are pure synonyms. How- 
ever, the Herfindahl formula suggests a less-than-perfect relation between frag- 
mentation and competition. Consider table 3C.  1, an example of three securi- 
ties,  all  with  75  percent  of  their  volume  on  the  NYSE  but  with  varying 
fractions of trading at competing venues. The example holds specialist compe- 
tition  at 25 percent but varies the dispersion of this competition across dif- 
Table 3C.l  Example of the Herfindahl Index 
Fraction of Trading 
Security  NYSE  Midwest  Pacific  Nasdaq  Herfindahl 
1  75  .25  0  0  .60 
2  .75  ,125  ,125  0  .34 
3  .75  ,0833  ,0833  ,0833  .24 76  Thomas H. McInish and Robert A. Wood 
fering numbers of alternative exchanges. In doing so, the Herfindahl index var- 
ies noticeably. Mechanically, therefore, fragmentation and competition are not 
perfect substitutes. More important, the given numbers raise thorny issues of a 
kind that have plagued the Justice Department as to whether specialist compe- 
tition is greater when one or many competitors have 25 percent of the market. 
An even more problematic aspect of interpreting the Herfindahl variable as 
a proxy for specialist competition stems from the lack of data on limit orders 
and floor trading activity in the sample of securities. Since the initial insights of 
Demsetz (1 968), microstructure theory has recognized that one factor keeping 
specialists honest is the heated competition on the floor of the NYSE itself. 1 
am concerned that such internal competition is likely  to be correlated with 
the off-board trading measured by the Herfindahl index and that the reported 
association between the Herfindahl and spreads may be driven in whole or part 
by the incidence of limit orders and floor trading activity. 
Similar missing-variable  arguments can be made regarding the emphasis of 
bid-ask spreads as the measure of market quality. We know that market quality 
is multidimensional and includes, in addition to spreads, the depth of quotes 
and  fraction  of  within-the-spread  executions.  Without  the  consideration  of 
these aspects of  market quality, the  authors cannot unambiguously  say that 
added off-board trading improves quality. It is possible that off-board trading 
lessens depth and thereby detracts from market quality. 
Sample selection  and endogeneity issues give further weight  to the point 
that the reported results do not lead to the causal inference that added off-board 
trading will improve market quality. In spite of the careful work of the authors, 
their study still faces sample-selection biases because their data requirements 
lead them to analyze only the hi-cap segment of the NYSE. But what if the 
data were available to study all NYSE listings? I wager this would strengthen 
the results, as the second-tier NYSE firms likely have wider spreads and less 
off-board trading. But certainly we would not interpret the results from such 
extended  analysis to say that  more off-board trading  will  lead to narrower 
spreads, as we know  that the  selection of trading location is endogenously 
chosen in the market. 
In the United States, there is a standard life cycle of a security from an OTC 
setting of many dealers, to the NYSE environment of  a single specialist to a 
hybrid system of  specialists and many dealers. Post-Big  Bang London also is 
experiencing such a hybrid life cycle (Waters [ 19921). For the purpose of the 
present study, this endogenous life cycle places further clouds over the inter- 
pretation  of the Herfindahl  measure. Does it really represent competition or 
are  the  off-board  trading  venues  merely  cream-skimming  bucket  shops? 
Blume and Goldstein (1  99  1) as well as a companion piece by  McInish  and 
Wood (1992) find that the regionals and Nasdaq free ride at least 90  percent of 
the time on trading in NYSE-listed securities. This free riding may impede the 
depth and absolute level of quotes. Such effects on market quality cannot be 
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authors’ conclusion that increased off-board trading will improve overall mar- 
ket quality. 
Opening the Black Box 
Moving from specific measurement issues to a more general perspective, I 
think the authors must broaden  the paradigm underlying their analysis. The 
authors  are  deeply  rooted  in  the  “NYSE-as-a-monopoly”  viewpoint  that 
strongly influenced  economists  at least up through May Day in  1975. This 
monopoly paradigm has gone the way of fixed commissions due to the practi- 
cal fact of the many domestic and global alternatives for trading NYSE listings. 
From a more intellectual standpoint, the monopoly label for organized finan- 
cial exchanges has been  rendered  obsolete by  the property-rights  model  of 
Ronald Coase and others, which tells us not to attach the tag of monopoly to a 
complex organization simply because we do not fully understand it. 
Coase (1988, 7-10)  himself admits that many economists still assume that 
the rules of  organized exchanges foment market power. But Coase chastises 
his colleagues for this presumption and notes that, for anything approaching 
perfect competition to exist, an intricate system of rules is required. For Coase, 
the term “rules” is synonymous with property rights and is quite distinct from 
SEC regulations. 
In  the Coasian spirit, I  think that any perceived problems inherent in the 
competitiodfragmentation debate can be mitigated via the allocation of prop- 
erty rights rather than by the extension of the arm of the SEC. What I have in 
mind is placing more solid property rights to listing in the hands of the listing 
corporations. Both initial listing decisions as well as additional trading loca- 
tions would be at the discretion of corporations and would not be co-opted by 
the  SEC’s grant of  unlisted trading privileges.  As Coase has taught us, this 
clear definition of property rights in listing would internalize the cost-benefit 
trade-offs involved in the competitiodfragmentation debate and would lead to 
the optimal number of trading locations for all publicly traded securities. The 
nice thing about the property-rights approach is that the amount of off-board 
trading for each  security is determined by  the  invisible hand of  the market 
rather than the visible, and clumsy, hand of the SEC. 
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Comment  John C. Coffee, Jr. 
Wood and McInish ask an important question: Does the fragmentation of trad- 
ing in multiply listed stocks harm or enhance market quality? But this is not 
the question they answer. Rather, they answer that in their study competition 
among markets seems to be producing slightly tighter spreads and lower pre- 
miums without  seriously affecting volatility. This is not fully responsive  to 
their own question, because more is involved in the assessment of market qual- 
ity. A focus on the average spread can be misleading, particularly if any aggre- 
gate improvement in the average bid-ask spread comes at significant expense 
to a discrete class of  market participants (here, small shareholders). Because 
there is evidence of  such injury to at least one class of investors and because 
the Wood and McInish study itself reveals only a very modest improvement in 
price spreads, the result is an uncertain trade-off between aggregate efficiency 
and distributive equity. In this light, it is far from self-evident that public policy 
should permit the kind of nonprice competition by  which emerging competi- 
tors in the third market and on regional exchanges seem to be diverting order 
flow from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
The first part of this brief comment examines this evidence that some invest- 
ors systematically lose as the result of contemporary intermarket competition, 
and the second part turns to the problematic character of competition based on 
payments for order flow. Although payments for order flow are not addressed 
in Wood's and McInish's paper, to omit this topic from a discussion of competi- 
tion among market centers is frankly like casting Humlet without the prince of 
Denmark. Indeed, the prevalence of nonprice competition (such as rebates for 
order flow), when coupled with the problem of informed trading, may explain 
why intermarket competition has yielded only the scant improvement in bid- 
ask spreads and Wood and McInish find. 
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Who Wins and Who Loses from Intermarket Competition 
The magnitude of the price effect shown by  the Wood and McInish data 
seems very modest. Comparing their portfolio 5 (which has the least order flow 
fragmentation) with their portfolio  1 (which has the most), one finds that the 
quoted spread falls by 0.6 cent and the liquidity premium declines by 0.5 cent. 
Although this change is certainly in the desired direction, such a slight im- 
provement in market efficiency may be thought insufficient to justify the possi- 
bility that some classes of  customers systematically lose when their transac- 
tions are diverted  away from the primary market (NYSE or American Stock 
Exchange [AMEX]) to other markets. A number of recent studies reach essen- 
tially this conclusion, each stressing different evidence. Lee (1993) finds that 
in  1988 and  1989 “[tlhe  average  price  difference  between  the  NYSE and 
matched off-Board trades is 0.7 to 1 cent per share.” Examining liquidity pre- 
miums, he further reports “that off-Board trades generally involve higher exe- 
cution costs in the order of 0.5 to 1.5 cents per share.” The most illuminating 
data uncovered  by  Lee emerges when he breaks down the average liquidity 
premium by trade size. On trades of one hundred to four hundred shares (the 
typical trade of small retail customers), the average excess liquidity premium 
paid for off-board trades in matched samples in 1989 was 1.22 cents (and 1.58 
and 2.65 cents per share when the trades were effected on the NASD or on the 
Cincinnati exchange, respectively). Yet, on larger trades above two thousand 
shares, some regional exchanges (most notably the Midwest and Pacific) of- 
fered significantly better executions than the NYSE. Thus, even if Wood and 
McInish are entirely correct in their conclusion that competition among market 
centers is reducing the average bid-ask spread, it appears that some rival mar- 
ket  centers  are besting  the  NYSE  by  offering  superior  execution  services 
(chiefly for midsized blocks), but others are offering inferior executions while 
diverting order flow by means of nonprice competition. 
Lee’s study has received some methodological criticism (on the ground that 
it does not adequately distinguish market and limit orders) and is subject to 
the further objection that its 1988 and 1989 data are now out-of-date because 
some third-market dealers have subsequently  introduced price-improvement 
programs under which they will in certain circumstances execute transactions 
between their own bid and asked quotations. Still, later studies have shown an 
even greater disparity between NYSE and off-board execution in the  same 
stock. Blume and Goldstein (1993) employ 1990 data to examine the extent of 
price improvement on the NYSE versus other markets. Similarly to Lee, they 
find the NYSE to significantly outperform rival markets on trade sizes below 
five hundred shares, but to lag behind some other markets on transactions in 
the five-hundred- to three-thousand-share range. Mayer and Leigh (1991) re- 
port that daily extreme prices (highs and lows) are significantly more likely 
to be off-board trades than mere chance would dictate. If  one accepts their 
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tomers and the daily lows are sales by them, this finding further corroborates 
the inferiority of off-board executions. Finally and most importantly, Fialkow- 
ski and Petersen (1992) use a data set consisting of the orders sent to all ex- 
changes from a major retail brokerage firm through automated routing systems 
during two days in 1991. They report that the expected price improvement per 
trade was 3 cents per share higher on the NYSE than on off-board transactions. 
This result  (which is three times above Lee’s estimate of  the disparity) may 
result both from the fact that they consider price improvement in one-eighth- 
point  markets’ and  because  a retail  brokerage  firm will  chiefly  be  routing 
smaller orders.2 
Another recent form of  study has been to compare the bid-ask  spreads on 
Nasdaq and exchange-listed common stocks, after controlling for differences 
in market capitalization. Grouping stocks into decile portfolios by market capi- 
talization, Goldstein (1993)  finds that all stock  exchanges had  significantly 
tighter price spreads (both in absolute terms and as a percentage of price) than 
Nasdaq in 1990. Indeed, he reports that 99 percent of the stocks traded on the 
exchanges had a lower average closing bid-ask spread than the median stock 
traded  on  Nasdaq’s National  Market  System. Focusing just on  stocks  that 
would meet NYSE listing requirements, he finds that the spreads are  15-18 
cents wider when  the  stocks trade only  on Nasdaq.  Similarly, Christie  and 
Huang  (1993)  find that,  when  issuers move from Nasdaq  to the  NYSE  or 
AMEX, the quoted spread narrows and the average liquidity premium declines. 
Such data are not inconsistent with the implication of the Wood and McInish 
study that intermarket competition reduces spreads, but they suggest that mar- 
ket structure is a critical variable. 
Still, at least one study suggests that competition can produce undesirable 
market fragmentation and higher volatility. Porter and Thatcher (1992) com- 
pare daily spreads of NYSE-listed stocks that were also listed on at least one 
regional exchange from 1987 to 1989. For some stocks, as volume increased 
on the regional exchanges, they find that the NYSE quoted spread narrowed in 
apparent response to this competition. But for other stocks, as volume rose on 
the regional exchanges, the NYSE spread increased-apparently  as the result 
of  market fragmentation. The dividing line, they find, depended on whether 
the average bid-ask spread exceeded $0.3 125. Above this level, increased vol- 
ume on the regional  exchange  seemed to produce market fragmentation, not 
tighter spreads. Whether competition from regional exchanges will widen or 
1. When the spread is an eighth of a point, price improvement typically occurs only in auction 
markets, because when public orders cross in them, one side by definition gets a superior price to 
the bid-ask spread in a dealer market. For example, if the spread is $10 to $10 1/8 and two public 
orders for one hundred shares cross, the transaction will be either at $10 (in which case the buyer 
does better than in a dealer market where it would normally be charged $10 1/8) or at $10 1/8 (in 
which case the seller does better than  in a dealer market where it would normally receive $10 
per share). 
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narrow the quoted spread on the NYSE depends, they surmise, on the volume 
of public limit orders in the stock. If they are correct, the direct challenge of a 
rival market (whether the third market  or a regional exchange) may be less 
important  in  inducing  narrower  spreads  than  the  influence  of  limit  orders 
(which dealer markets may not process or may treat  less favorably than  do 
auction markets). 
Price Competition versus Cream Skimming 
When order flow is diverted from a primary exchange to a rival market cen- 
ter, proponents of  intermarket competition assume that there is an efficiency 
gain: either (1) the customer is getting a better price (whether in the form of a 
tighter spread or a between-the-spread execution) or (2) the broker is receiving 
a rebate for its order flow, which it presumably passes on to the customer (ei- 
ther in whole or at least in part) in the form of a reduced brokerage commis- 
sion. But this assumption of a net cost saving may be incorrect, for either of 
two distinct reasons. 
First, the customer may experience a loss greater than the rebate paid to the 
broker. According to several commentators, the typical payment for order flow 
in the case of a NYSE-listed stock is 1 cent per share.’ But, according to Fial- 
kowski and Petersen (1992), the expected price improvement that is forgone 
when transactions are diverted away from the NYSE is 3 cents per share. Thus, 
there is an asymmetry between the broker’s gain and the customer’s loss. In 
effect, the customer loses the expected value of an execution between the bid 
and asked spread (worth 3 cents), and there is no way, even in a highly efficient 
market for brokerage services, that the broker can “pass on” the  1 -cent rebate 
it receives so as to compensate the customer fully for its 3-cent loss. 
Second, rival market centers appear to be following a general  strategy of 
“cream  skimming”  rather  than  directly  contesting  the  primary  exchanges 
across the board. This is evident in three distinct respects. First, third-market 
dealers do not attempt to compete for order flow on most NYSE-listed stocks. 
The NYSE estimates that order flow payments are currently common with re- 
gard to some 428 NYSE-listed stock~,~  and the practice of paying for order 
flow is far less pervasive with regard to AMEX stocks. Why? Seemingly, third- 
market makers find it profitable to pay for flow only in actively traded stocks. 
Second, rival market centers still engage in  derivative pricing; that is, they 
simply match the NYSE specialist’s quoted spread, rarely moving their own 
bid and asked quotations inside the specialist’s. Although there is some evi- 
3. Qpically, a payment is made for order flow only if (I) the trading spread exceeds one-eighth 
of a point, (2) a minimum monthly order flow is promised (usually 100,000 shares), (3) the trans- 
action does not exceed a maximum size (often 3,000 shares), and (4) certain source restrictions 
are observed (no professional traders). See Coffee (1991); National Association of Securities Deal- 
ers (1991). 
4. I was provided this estimate by  James E. Shapiro of  the NYSE Research and Planning Di- 
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dence of  change, the NYSE still largely  monopolizes price  discovery. Has- 
brouck  (1 993) examined quote data at  one-second  intervals  for three high- 
volume NYSE-listed stocks that also trade heavily on other markets. He found 
that between  80 and 90 percent  of  price  discovery  occurred on the NYSE. 
McInish and Wood (1992) find that a better bid or offer is available off-board 
only 11 percent of the time for NYSE-listed stocks and 7 percent of the time 
for AMEX stocks (although they also identify some stocks in which a regional 
exchange has the “best bid or offer” as much as 40 percent of the time). 
Third, the regional exchanges focus their efforts on competing for smaller 
trades in NYSE-listed stocks. In 1988, trades of  nine hundred shares or less 
represented over 75 percent of all transactions in NYSE-listed securities on the 
Boston, Midwest, Pacific, and Philadelphia exchanges, as well as on the NASD 
(see Lee 1993, 1017). Why? The best explanation may be that rival market 
centers want to avoid the professional  (or “informed’) trader and obtain trans- 
actions from less sophisticated (or “uninformed”) retail customers. Derivative 
pricing is a means to this end. By simply matching the bid-ask quotation of the 
NYSE or AMEX (and declining to pay for order flow on large or professional 
trades), the rival market center does not attract order flow from informed trad- 
ers. If instead the third-market maker or regional specialist were to quote the 
inside spread, it could not refuse to deal with the professional trader under the 
Intermarket Trading System’s rules. The result is that the burden of adverse 
selection  falls  disproportionately  on  the  primary  exchange  specialist,  who 
loses the “safe” business of the retail customer but must accept the problematic 
trades of the professional. 
If  one accepts this premise that rival market centers do not want to expose 
themselves to informed traders and so will not quote a bid-ask  spread inside 
that of  the NYSE specialist, it may explain why the benefits of  intermarket 
competition in the Wood and McInish study are so modest (i.e., no more than 
0.6 cent). Moreover, the ability of  the NYSE specialist to narrow its spreads 
further in response to competitive pressure would also appear to be limited. As 
uninformed  trades are diverted  to rival market centers, informed trades will 
represent an increasing percentage of  the trades it handles, and the logical re- 
sponse to informed trading is to widen (not narrow) the bid-ask spread. 
In this light, competition from rival market centers that is not based on price 
competition (i,e., payments for order flow and similar practices) may stalemate 
the public policy objective of narrower bid-ask spreads. Even reforms such as 
decimalization,  which  should induce a lower-cost market center to quote  a 
tighter spread in order to obtain order flow, may be significantly frustrated if 
the more efficient market maker can hope instead to divert a nonrepresentative 
and “safer” order flow by offering rebates to the broker for desired transac- 
tions. To be sure, the extent of the “informed” trading problem has not been 
reliably estimated.5 But beyond the traditionally cited reasons-unfairness  to 
5. New literature suggests that “informed trades are concentrated in the medium-sized cate- 
gory.”  See Barclay and Warner (1993). But, as noted earlier, midsized blocks appear to be the one 83  Competition, Fragmentation, and Market Quality 
the customer and the asserted risk of  market fragmentation-there  may be a 
third reason for public policy to disfavor payments for order flow: it may chill 
price competition and reduce the efficiency gains that normally should accrue 
from intermarket competition. 
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Authors’ Reply 
The comments by Coffee and Mulherin have two focuses: (1) the economic 
perspective underlying our paper, and (2) technical questions about our proce- 
dures and findings. We will respond to each of these in turn. 
The Economic Perspective 
Philosophical differences exist between Mulherin’s and Coffee’s views and 
our views of the competition for order flow among the New York Stock Ex- 
area where regional exchanges are attracting order flow away from the NYSE, based on traditional 
price  competition. See Lee  (1993); Blume  and Goldstein (1993). Hence, the magnitude  of  in- 
formed trading as a barrier to price competition that tightens the bid-ask spread remains debatable. 84  Thomas H. McInish and Robert A. Wood 
change (NYSE), the regionals, and the third-market  broker-dealers.  We  will 
outline their views and contrast them with ours. 
Mulherin subscribes to a Coasian perspective in which, ideally, no regula- 
tory intervention would interfere with the invisible hand’s allocation of order 
flow so as to optimize  global welfare.  Corporations’  property  rights  would 
allow them, within the framework of our legal system, to determine where their 
stock would be traded. With this view, corporations, acting in the interests of 
their shareholders, will determine an optimal allocation of order flow among 
the NYSE, regional exchanges, and third-market dealers. According to Coase, 
exchange rules such as those of  the NYSE (perhaps complex and difficult to 
understand) may “exist in order to  reduce transactions costs and therefore to 
increase the volume of trade” (I  988, 9). 
Coffee’s  philosophical  perspective,  which  is  primarily  focused on price 
competition,  leads  to the view  that  the regionals  and  third-market  broker- 
dealers are cream skimming, free riders that compete unfairly with practices 
such as the purchase of order flow and do not contribute significantly  to the 
price discovery process. One might infer from Coffee’s statements that invest- 
ors would be better served if the regional exchanges were eliminated and third- 
market dealers were prohibited by fiat from trading listed securities. Then the 
order flow would be concentrated at the NYSE and the market depth max- 
imized at one location. We are concerned that the NYSE specialists would not 
use their then supreme market power for the public benefit but rather for their 
own wealth enhancement. 
Our philosophical view of the competition for listed order flow stems from 
(1) a pragmatic  assessment  of  the present  regulatory  environment,  and  (2) 
Stigler’s dominant-firm oligopoly model (1940, 1964), which, in our opinion, 
describes the competition for listed order flow. Garbade and Silber (1979)  were 
the first to characterize the NYSE as the dominant competitor, with the region- 
als and third-market dealers offering  satellite competition. In the dominant- 
firm  oligopoly model, satellite competitors are unable to compete on price but 
rather must offer superior service through better technology and in other ways, 
attention to local clientele, and so forth (McInish and Wood 1995).  The NYSE 
publicly  invites  price competition  (bettering  quotes) from the  satellites, yet 
according to this model this is precisely the kind of competition that they are 
far less able to offer, particularly with trading in eighths. Thus, the principal 
arena for competition is technology, not price. In fact, before we seriously con- 
sider abolishing the satellite competitors we should remember that all of the 
extensive  technological  innovations  in  market  mechanisms  during the past 
thirty years  have been  initiated  by  the regional  exchanges, the third-market 
dealers, and the proprietary trading systems (PTSs),’  with the NYSE matching 
1. PTSs include Inatinet (continuous and crossing), Posit, and the Arizona Stock Exchange call 
auction system. Competition to NYSE specialists is also provided by  Morgan Stanley’s Market 
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innovations to avoid loss of market share. According to an early study by Gar- 
vey, “[tlhe initiative of minor exchanges was of no less importance in inducing 
the Regular Board [NYSE] to modernize its trading technique” (1944, 142). 
Dominant competitors have little incentive to innovate. 
Within  the  framework of  the  dominant-firm  oligopoly  model,  Salop and 
Scheffman show that raising rivals’ costs is a strategy used by dominant firms 
to gain market share: “It may be relatively inexpensive for a dominant firm to 
raise rivals’ costs substantially” (Salop and Scheffman 1983, 267). “Possible 
cost-raising strategies include . . . lobbying legislatures or regulatory agencies 
to create regulations that disadvantage rivals.”  (Salop and Scheffman  1987, 
19). We believe that evidence exists (discussed below) that supports the view 
that the dominant-firm oligopoly model and the strategy of raising rivals’ costs 
accurately characterize the competition for order flow in listed stocks. Thus, 
Coffee appears to view the NYSE as a benevolent competitor without selfish 
motives  while  satellites  possess  less  pure  motives;  our perspective  is  that 
NYSE behavior is better explained by the nonprice predation (i.e., cost preda- 
tion) literature. 
This philosophy leads to several positions that differ from the Mulherin and 
Coffee views. 
Accusing satellite competitors of cream skimming and free riding reflects, 
in our opinion, a misunderstanding of the role of competition in a dominant- 
firm environment, which, as noted above, is not primarily focused on price. 
As we and others have found, the satellites do contribute meaningfully  to 
price discovery (McInish and Wood [  1993al; Hams, McInish, Shoesmith, and 
Wood [ 199.51; Hasbrouck [ 19931; Garbade and Silber [  1979]), providing price 
leadership 10-20  percent of the time. Assuming the dominant-firm oligopoly 
model is the appropriate paradigm to characterize the competition for listed 
order flow, it is not sensible to expect more of the satellites. 
As Demsetz  (1982) notes, a fine line exists between property rights  and 
regulatory barriers to entry. Even Coase recognizes the possibility of exchange 
rules being administered so as to limit competition. Coase (1988, 9) quotes 
Adam Smith on this point: “To widen the market may frequently be agreeable 
enough to the interest of the public, but to narrow the competition must always 
be against it.” We  are concerned that property-rights arguments may lead to 
regulatory bamers to competition. To  illustrate our concern, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission  (SEC) has  limited the trading hours of  the Arizona 
Stock Exchange call auction system (AZX) to thirty minutes before the NYSE 
open and one hour after the NYSE close. This restriction imposes serious limi- 
tations on the use of the AZX: traders  must  stay late at the  office to place 
orders and print the resulting trades typically through third-market dealers. Additional order flow 
is matched internally and printed off-board by  the large retail brokers such as Merrill Lynch and 
Shearson. The ability of brokers and large buy-side institutions to profitably cross orders internally 
is, in our opinion, further evidence of the existence of  rents on the NYSE. 86  Thomas H. McInish and Robert A. Wood 
orders,  indexers may not be able to capture market-on-close  prices,  and  SO 
forth. Many other NYSE and SEC rules and regulations hamper the use of the 
PTSs. We agree with Oesterle, Winslow, and Anderson (1992) that the NYSE 
quotes are not more proprietary than those of any other vendor. Can K-Mart 
prohibit their competitors from using their quoted prices? Since futures mar- 
kets lead cash markets, does this mean that the NYSE is free riding on the 
futures markets?2 We also think that the property rights of investors are being 
overlooked. Our discussions with institutional buy-side3 traders reveals dismay 
that the property-rights  argument is being used to limit their use of PTSs.? In 
their estimation, they own the quotes that stem from their limit orders, not the 
NYSE. Contrary to Mulherin, we  submit that buy-side  traders are far more 
qualified to make decisions about where orders should be executed than the 
boards of directors or executives of public corporations. 
Purchase of order flow, instead of being a nefarious scheme to bilk investors, 
may merely reflect the fact that rents exist (i.e., that spreads are wider than are 
needed to generate a return required by the riskiness of market making) on the 
floor of the NYSE. Or it may simply be a way of separating informed from 
uninformed order flow. Further, these moneys flow into the competitive retail 
brokerage arena. At this point, we observe discount brokers offering trade exe- 
cutions for no commission. Further, we observe Madoff clones competing for 
his business. 
Having established  the differences  among our views and those of our re- 
viewers regarding the competition  for order flow, we next consider evidence 
that can help discriminate among these views. 
Evidence That Discriminates among the Three Perspectives 
In this section, we offer evidence that supports our view that NYSE behavior 
can be explained with the paradigm of raising rivals’ costs. We also offer evi- 
dence that discriminates between NY SE behavior that increases the NYSE vol- 
ume at the expense of its competitors, versus behavior that increases the aggre- 
2. We thank Robert Neal for this insight. 
3. “Buy-side’’ refers to the money managers-mutual  funds, pension funds, and so forth-and 
individual investors, while “sell-aide” refers to the brokerage firms and the market centers. This 
terminology historically arose because stocks are considered to be sold. 
4. The PTSs currently present the most serious threat to the NYSE, since they provide trading 
features that the more aggressive institutional buy-side traders desire: anonymity, which prevents 
front-running (they hate their agent’s also being their competitor);  transparency; the ability to enter 
and control orders directly without going through an intermediary; lower commissions, since they 
are not  subsidizing  immediacy;  low trading costs;  the  ability  to  see  depth for  a montage  of 
quotes-four  price increments on either side (that is, thcy see the whole book); the ability to trade 
electronically; the opportunity to avoid subsidizing the liquidity needs of others; the ability to post 
quotes in decimals and to be able to gain priority by  bettering quotes by  1 cent; and so forth. 
Liquidity naturally attracts order flow. This fact, combined with the NYSE’s anticompetitive rules, 
provides the NYSE with a decided competitive advantage as the dominant market center. The 
recent rapid growth in trading on the PTSs that is occurring in  the face of  the natural NYSE 
advantage reflects the strong preference aggressive buy-side traders have for the PTSs. At  this 
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gate  order  flow  from  a  Coasian  perspective,  the  former  behavior  being 
anticompetitive.  In addition  to the evidence cited below, our views are also 
based on scores of discussions with investment professionals. 
McInish and Wood (1995) show that the NYSE specialists fail to display 
about one-half of all limit orders that are inside existing quotes for a sample 
of  118 NYSE-listed stocks, in apparent contravention of SEC regulations. Why 
would the NYSE specialists engage in such conduct? As noted above, while 
satellite competitors are unable to beat the dominant firm on price, they must 
match its price. If the NYSE obfuscates true prices by  systematically hiding 
limit  orders, the satellite competitors, according to regional  specialists with 
whom  we  have  discussed  this  matter,  must  engage in  costly  procedures  to 
discover  true  prices  (Harris, McInish,  and  Wood  1993). Presently,  the  re- 
gionals do so by submitting their own limit and market orders in small quan- 
tities  to  the  NYSE, while  some third-market  dealers  engage in the  costly 
practice of temporarily displaying limit orders if the spread is wider than one 
eighth.’ To block this practice, the AMEX has submitted a proposed rule to im- 
pose restrictions on so-called competing dealers to the SEC, which, if imple- 
mented, would  place  regional  specialists’  orders at  the  end of  the  NYSE/ 
AMEX queues (SEC  1994, 111-11). If  implemented,  this proposal  will seri- 
ously impact the ability of  regional  specialists  to determine true prices. The 
SEC’s Division of Market  Regulation concludes that “the proposal’s restric- 
tions are imposed primarily for competitive reasons. Accordingly, the Division 
recommends that  the AMEX amend or withdraw  the proposal”  (SEC 1994, 
111- 11). 
A NYSE rule that is anticompetitive in that it increases NYSE volume at the 
expense of their competitors is rule 390, which prohibits a broker from execut- 
ing principal trades or agency trades, if the broker has both sides of the trade, 
off  the exchanges  (i.e.,  off  the Intermarket  Trading  System) (McInish  and 
Wood 1992b). 
Rule 500 makes delisting from the NYSE extremely  difficult, which, ac- 
cording to the SEC’s Market 2000 report, is considered to be an anticompeti- 
tive rule by  market participants.6 The SEC’s Division  of Market  Regulation 
5. Other important aspects of hiding limit orders are that (1) the practice results in the illusion 
of price improvement, which the NYSE characterizes as market orders crossing within the spread 
but which in many cases results from executions against hidden limit orders; and (2) it creates a 
fiduciary responsibility on the part of  money managers to execute trades on  the NYSE, since 
illusion of price improvement exists. (We thank Junius Peake for this insight.) If the true spreads 
were revealed by the NYSE at all times, they would be matched by the satellites. Thus, the illusory 
price improvement would disappear. The practice of hiding limit orders is an example of the NYSE 
market power and its willingness to use such power to disadvantage the competition. 
6.  Rule 500 states, in part: “In the absence of special circumstances, a security considered by 
the Exchange to be eligible for continued listing will not be removed from the list upon request or 
application of the issuer, unless the proposed withdrawal from listing is approved by  the security 
holders at a meeting at which a substantial percentage of the outstanding amount of the particular 
security is represented, without objection to the proposed withdrawal from a substantial number 
of  individual holders.” (CCH 1991, 2597) Thus, delisting cannot simply be approved by  a com- 
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“cannot identify any justification for the stringent approval requirements [for 
delisting] built into NYSE Rule 500” (SEC 1994, 31). 
The NYSE policy that any new listing is prohibited from trading on region- 
als or in the third market for the first month does not foster increased aggregate 
trading volume. Rather, it is anticompetitive. 
The NYSE resistance to decimal trading, which Peake (1  995) perceives to 
be the last vestige of fixed commissions, can hardly be construed as a policy 
that will enhance aggregate volume. The NYSE policy of  fixed commission, 
which ended by SEC fiat in 1975, clearly was not designed to increase order 
flow. 
The Security Investment Automation  Corporation  (SIAC),  which  is two- 
thirds owned by the NYSE, rounds trades and quotes from PTSs to eighths, 
masking price advantages that might be offered by the PTSs. Thus competition 
is limited, and NYSE volume is enhanced, while aggregate order flow is not in- 
creased. 
Response to Coffee and Mulherin Specific Concerns 
Mulherin and Coffee note that we find only 0.6 cent difference in spread 
between  the portfolios with the greatest and the  least fragmentation,  which 
averages $8.46 per trade, or $1,040 per day per stock. Yet this position ignores 
what spreads would be if the NYSE had no competitors. McInish and Wood 
(1992a) show that competition reduces spreads. As Neal (1987) finds for op- 
tions markets, the mere presence of a competitor will reduce spreads. Our goal 
is to test the NYSE position that fragmentation harms markets. Our evidence 
does not support the NYSE position. Further,  Branch and Freed  state “that 
competition appears to play a much larger role in restraining NYSE spreads 
than increased volume might play if  trading were more concentrated on the 
Big Board” (1977, 163). 
Mulherin and Coffee point out that we do not address other market-quality 
issues such as depth and trades between quotes. To investigate this objection, 
we examine market depth. We find that market depth, as measured by the aver- 
age bid depth plus ask depth for each quote, is essentially identical across the 
five portfolios for both the NYSE and for the other market centers. Thus, frag- 
mentation does not alter depth. Given the finding in McInish and Wood (1995, 
in press) that NYSE specialists hide about half of all limit orders that are inside 
existing spreads, it may not be possible to measure trades between the quotes 
in a meaningful way. 
Mulherin questions the use of the Herfindahl index as a measure offragmen- 
tation. While other measures might be used, depending  on one’s conception 
of  fragmentation, the Herfindahl  index is widely  employed as a measure of 
concentration (competition or lack thereof) in the industrial organization liter- 
ature. To address Mulherin’s concern, we create an alternate measure of compe- 
tition motivated by  Neal’s findings cited above, by calculating the number of 
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ing.’ The research design was replicated for this metric. The mean number of 
competitors for the five portfolios ranges from 3.1 to 5.2. The correlations of 
this metric with SPREAD, PREMIUM, and VOLATILITY are -0.94,  -0.98, 
and -0.52,  respectively, with corresponding confidence levels of 0.01  7,0.004, 
and 0.38. These results, using the alternate measure of fragmentation, confirm 
even more strongly that fragmentation does not appear to harm markets. 
Mulherin is concerned that the inferences drawn from the sample can be 
questioned because we use only hi-cap stocks, but, in fact, we have included 
stocks of  all sizes in our sample. In  fact, the market value of  the smallest of 
our 980 firms is only $31 million. We  exclude only NYSE stocks that do not 
have  a minimal trading level of  at least one thousand shares (to avoid thin- 
trading biases), that trade at less than $5 per share (to avoid aberrant spread 
behavior), or that do not have both Institute for the Study of Security Markets 
and Compustat data. Further, Mulherin conjectures that the second tier of firms 
in our sample “likely have wider spreads and less off-board trading.” To  test 
this conjecture, we divided the sample firms into two groups based on size and 
find that he is correct. The percentage of  dollar volume traded on the NYSE 
for each group is large firms, 87.8 percent; small firms, 85.5 percent. While 
this difference is statistically significant, it does not seem to be practically sig- 
nificant. 
Mulherin expresses concern that a positive correlation between the Herfin- 
dahl index and the limit orders and crowd activity may drive our results. Unfor- 
tunately, the NYSE does not release data that would permit us to evaluate this 
conjecture. (We are able to discriminate between block and nonblock trades- 
replicating our study with the elimination of block trades does not change our 
findings.) Yet in our opinion Mulherin’s view seems unlikely since this would 
require stocks that have greater floor and limit order activity to also have pro- 
portionally greater regional trading activity. 
Mulherin posits a life-cycle hypothesis wherein the age of  the firm is posi- 
tively correlated with the Herfindahl index and, in turn, with bid-ask spread, 
so that our research design may have been confounded. Yet this exactly is the 
kind of  confounding that the linear program is designed to protect against. 
Note that the first and second moments of a number of variables related to the 
life cycle of  firms are held equal in each of  the five portfolios. Specifically, 
these are the dividend payout ratio, market-to-book ratio, asset value, financial 
leverage, dollar value of trading, and beta. Thus, we feel reasonably confident 
that the life-cycle concern has been accounted for to the best of our ability. 
Coffee expresses concern that some investors are disadvantaged by  trades 
on the satellites and cites a series of  papers. In our opinion, he  is drawing 
inferences concerning investor welfare that are not justified by  our present 
knowledge of market microstructure. A great many issues about trading costs 
7. For a discussion of additional studies that have used number of competitors as a proxy for 
competition, see McInish and Wood (1993a). 90  Thomas H. McInish and Robert A. Wood 
are not yet clearly understood.8 He further cites evidence comparing Nasdaq 
quotes with NYSE quotes-our  paper did not mention Nasdaq. However, for 
a perspective of NY SE versus Nasdaq spreads that differs from Coffee’s, see 
McInish and Wood (1993b). 
Mulherin also argues “that the selection of trading location is endogenously 
chosen in the market.” This disregards the impact of  anticompetitive NYSE 
rules such as rule 500 and rule 390. 
Coffee points out that Porter and Thatcher (1992) find that increased compe- 
tition from regional exchanges narrowed NYSE spreads for stocks with rela- 
tively low initial spreads, but increased spreads for stock with relatively high 
initial spreads. Coffee concludes from this finding that “increased  volume on 
the regional exchange seemed to produce market fragmentation,  not tighter 
spreads.” We believe that the wider spreads in the face of  increased regional 
competition are more likely to reflect an increased incidence of  hiding limit 
orders as a competitive response by NYSE specialists. 
Coffee argues that in the presence  of  asymmetric  information the NYSE 
specialist must widen the spread even further if the probability of being picked 
off by an informed trader (in the midsize range especially) rises because unin- 
formed order flow has been attracted by  rebates offered by  satellite competi- 
tors. But, if Coffee is otherwise correct, his thinking fails to incorporate (1) 
the fact that this process is, like all market phenomena, self-limiting and (2) 
the implication of the NYSE being the dominant competitor. To clarify, frag- 
mentation, interacting with the asymmetric information to raise that compo- 
nent of the spread, drives both informed  and uninformed  order flow to the 
satellites. So it is not as though fragmentation has caused these higher spreads 
associated with the movement of order flow to the satellites; fragmentation is 
also the result of  the dominant-firm price leader having the market power to 
raise spreads to cover the cost of being picked off. The satellites certainly do 
not have this ~ption.~ 
To summarize, we continue to affirm that the data do not support the NYSE 
contention that fragmentation harms investors. We  are sympathetic with  the 
world Mulherin champions, where nothing stands in the way of  the invisible 
hand’s allocation  of  order  flow among  competitors.  But  our view  that  the 
dominant-firm oligopoly model is the appropriate paradigm to characterize the 
competition for listed order flow, combined with our pragmatic assessment of 
8. For example, we are aware of two studies conducted by buy-side firms that extensively exam- 
ine trading performance on the NYSE, regional exchanges, and Nasdaq, finding essentially no 
difference in execution costs. These studies have the advantage of knowing the characteristics of 
each order-data  not yet made available to academics by the NYSE. Further insights are provided 
by Angel (1994) and Chan and Lakonishok (1991).  Additional concerns are that trading-cost stud- 
ies have not been extended to the PTSs  and that they do not include all trading costs. For example, 
commission costs on the PTSs can be as low as 1-2  cents a share compared to 5-6  cents a share 
on the NYSE. Further, front-running costs, which may be largely avoided on the PTSs, are not 
yet measured. 
9. We have benefited from discussions with Frederick Hams on this topic. 91  Competition, Fragmentation, and Market Quality 
what can realistically be accomplished in the present regulatory environment, 
causes us to be less sanguine about moving from the present state of  competi- 
tion to our ideal trading world following the Mulherin path. It is not our goal, 
as Mulherin suggests, that the SEC extend its regulatory reach. We are encour- 
aged that the Market 2000 report does not move in that direction. In our opin- 
ion, if  the PTSs were able to compete without any regulatory obstacles, the 
costs of  trading services presently being paid by the institutional buy-side to 
the sell-side would be reduced by 50-75  percent. 
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